That's why he used the word, "might." Some people wouldn't feel a moral responsibility to pull a toddler back out of the path of a speeding bus; but many people would--and if flyosity is one of the latter, he might appreciate being made aware of the situation and his personal abilities vis-a-vis the pulling.
Well I was more thinking in terms of the discussion at hand - does one have (or, 'might there be') a moral responsibility to change a life's direction (new career) when one can make much more money that can then be used to help others. In that context, I am vehement that there is no such responsibility.
Pull a toddler out of that path of a bus - I'm not sure, I think so, but I'm not sure; I don't have a rational reason for it that can be derived from my moral axioms. I don't care very much either at this point, it's a different discussion I think (or at least a discussion much further down a sliding scale). For the case presented, I do have a strong opinion about, and felt offended at the thought that someone would suggest there is such a responsibility. Which is why I responded.
For what it's worth I also don't believe in morality in enough of a way for you to reasonably get offended. I don't believe in the existence of a responsibility but I believe people often act as if they have such responsibilities anyways. My beliefs are way more meta than my comment indicated which was simplified given the short amount of time I spent writing it and a perceived possible lowest common denominator audience.
Pretend I said "something like a moral responsibility" or "an important intuitive one sense that one action is better than another action". There is no such thing as a moral responsibility.
The two situations are hard to reconcile because your moral axioms are an attempt to make a simple, coherent system starting from your moral intuitions; but your moral intuitions do not actually arise from a simple, coherent system.
In the case presented, the only differences from the toddler's are the time required to save the lives, and the psychological availability of the lives saved.
Unless your moral intuitions and/or moral axioms allow lower levels of responsibility for suffering which is easier to ignore, the "time required" is the only escape.
If you lived in a world where toddlers were perpetually falling under busses in front of you, would you be morally obligated to stay in good physical condition and pay attention to nearby toddlers so you could save more of them? If not, you should be safe from the responsibility to maximize your income and use the surplus to save lives.
Eh, no. Nobody has any moral responsibility to live their lives for someone else's sake.