Intellectually, there seems to be something as wrong with avoiding anthropomorphism when discussing human endeavors (such as language) as there is with anthropomorphic explanations of erosion or chemical reactions. Skinnarian approaches to language may leave people unsatisfied because there is no story, just clinical observation.
Norvig's approach (as characterized in the article) takes the the "Artificial" in "Artificial Intelligence" to include the mechanism by which an intelligence makes decisions. Chompsky's aesthetic of linguistics applied to AI would treat "Artificial" as a description of the platform in which an intelligence is embodied (i.e. non-biological) while requiring the platform to operate linguistically on the same principles as a "natural intelligence."
Norvig's approach (as characterized in the article) is essentially a better Eliza (or Ford's faster horse).
If one takes the Turing Test as scientifically meaningful rather than an engineering standard, then one falls in one camp or the other and the Norvig Chompsky debate is over a pseudo-problem. "Artificial Intelligence" is in that sense metaphysical jargon.
Skinner's book Verbal Behavior was mostly unsatisfying because it didn't have a lot of data; it really just laid out a research program which had not been carried out in any significant way (and now, never will be). Of course it is also unsatisfying that Skinner does not appeal to our sense that we already understand everything important about psychology and language "from the inside" and don't really need any stinking data.
The reason most people are unsatisfied with Skinner's approach to language is that they did not read Verbal Behavior, but rather Chomsky's review; and because Chomsky chose it (as among Skinner's weakest work) and reviewed it in the most uncharitable way possible, without understanding any of the basic concepts or motivations to Skinner's approach.
So, for example, he successfully associates Skinner directly with Watson, and makes it out that "radical" behaviorism is radical not for its rejection of premises of classical behaviorism but for being even more crazy.
That review is a masterpiece of propaganda and it effectively prevented Skinner's basic ideas from even being seriously evaluated ever again.
Norvig's approach (as characterized in the article) takes the the "Artificial" in "Artificial Intelligence" to include the mechanism by which an intelligence makes decisions. Chompsky's aesthetic of linguistics applied to AI would treat "Artificial" as a description of the platform in which an intelligence is embodied (i.e. non-biological) while requiring the platform to operate linguistically on the same principles as a "natural intelligence."
Norvig's approach (as characterized in the article) is essentially a better Eliza (or Ford's faster horse).
If one takes the Turing Test as scientifically meaningful rather than an engineering standard, then one falls in one camp or the other and the Norvig Chompsky debate is over a pseudo-problem. "Artificial Intelligence" is in that sense metaphysical jargon.